Dario Cecchini

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Bio

I’ve been a postdoctoral researcher at NC State University since November 2022. I belong to the NeuroComputational Ethics research group, assisting Dr. Dubljević with the NSF project “Virtual Reality Simulations of Moral Decision Making for Autonomous Vehicles”.

I obtained a Ph.D. in moral philosophy in March 2022 at the University of Genoa (Italy) with a dissertation entitled: Sensitive to Reasons: Moral Intuition and the Dual Process Challenge to Ethics. Before enrolling in my Ph.D. program, I studied philosophy at the University of Pisa (MA degree) and the University of Florence (BA degree).

I work on issues at the intersection of moral psychology, moral epistemology, and applied ethics. My current research projects concern moral judgment, the alignment problem for AI, and the ethics of autonomous vehicles.

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Area(s) of Expertise

AOS: moral psychology, applied ethics
AOC: normative ethics, epistemology, deontic logic, metaphysics

Publications

• Moral Complexity in Traffic: Advancing the ADC Model for Automated Driving Systems , SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING ETHICS (2025)
• Aligning artificial intelligence with moral intuitions: an intuitionist approach to the alignment problem , AI and Ethics (2024)
• The Reliability Challenge to Moral Intuitions , NEUROETHICS (2024)
• What's Left of Moral Bioenhancement? Reviewing a 15-Year Debate , HEC FORUM (2024)
• Moral judgment in realistic traffic scenarios: moving beyond the trolley paradigm for ethics of autonomous vehicles , AI & SOCIETY (2023)
• Are moral intuitions intellectual perceptions? , Rivista internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia (2022)
• Moral intuition, strength, and metacognition , Philosophical Psychology (2022)
• Dual-process reflective equilibrium: rethinking the interplay between intuition and reflection in moral reasoning , Philosophical Explorations (2021)
• Experiencing the Conflict: The Rationality of Ambivalence , The Journal of Value Inquiry (2021)
• Problems for hard moral particularism: Can we really dismiss general reasons? , Philosophical Inquiries (2020)

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